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court's reaffirmance of its previous position, allows the burden of finding the ulti-
mate owner and the risk of his insolvency to remain on the stockholder of record.
For a discussion of the problems involved see I. H. Cohen, Impleader: Enforcement
of Defendants' Rights Against Third Parties (1933) 33 COLUMBIrA LAW REV. 1147,
1176 et seq.
TAXATION-ADUDICATION OF DOmIcILE-DouBLE INHERTANCE TAxATION.-For
some years the decedent maintained residences in both Pennsylvania and New
Jersey. On his death both states levied inheritance taxes on the value of his in-
tangible personalty, each proceeding on the premise that it was the state of domi-
cile. On appeal from the New Jersey levy, the executors offered as conclusive of
the decedent's domicile in Pennsylvania, a final Pennsylvania judgmen upholding
the tax by that state. The United States Supreme Court had refused to review that
judgment because of improper presentation of the federal question in the court
below. Held, affirmed. Domicile is a jurisdictional fact and the full faith and
credit clause neither forbids inquiry intothe jurisdiction of the foreign court nor
requires recognition of judgments given in the absence of jurisdiction. The
Pennsylvania adjudication of domicile is erroneous. In re Dorrance's Estate, 170
Atl. 601 (N. J. Prerogative Ct. 1934).
The restriction of the power to levy inheritance taxes on intangibles to the
state of domicile? was imposed to avoid double taxation. Achievement of this end
seems to require final determination of the question of domicile by the Supreme
Court of the United States. Injury to a private citizen does not raise a contro-
versy between states' which would bring a suit by one state to enjoin a tax levy
by the other within the original jurisdiction of the Court. Such a suit, essayed by
New Jersey in' the instant controversy, was dismissed.5 Traditionally, the ques-
tion of domicile is decided according to the law of the forum,' and considering it a
question of state law, difficulties in obtaining a review are encountered.' But
federal principles are applicable to discover whether a levy falls within the constitu-
tional ban on extra-jurisdictional taxation. Thus, the Court reconsiders a state
tribunal's characterization of personalty as tangible or intangible, where the con-
stitutionality of taxation is dependent on the determination! Similarly, state court
findings that intangibles have acquired a business situs rendering them taxable or
that corporations are so engaged in business within the state as to be subject to a
privilege tax, 0 are not final. By analogy, inconsistent findings of domicile might
raise a reviewable issue.U But ascertainment of intent, upon which domicile
'In re Dorrance's Estate, 309 Pa. 151, 163 Atl. 303 (1932), discussed in
(1932) 81 U. OF PA. L. REv. 177.
'287 U. S. 660 (1932) ; 288 U. S. 617 (1933).
'First National Bank of Boston v. Maine, 284 U.S. 312 (1931) ; Farmer's
Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U. S. 204 (1930).
'Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U. S.'1 (1899).
'New Jersey v. Pennsylvania, 287 U. S. 580 (1932).
o°  RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1930) § 11. But see F. W. Harper, Final
Determination of Domicile in the United States (1934) 9 Ind. L. J. 586, 588.
'Enterprise Irrigation Dist. v. Farmers' Mutual Canal Co., 243 U. S. 157
(1917). But cf. Ancient Egyptian Order v. Michaux, 279 U. S. 737 (1928).
'Blodgett v. Silberman, 277 U. S. 1 (1927)., Beidler v. South Carolina Tax Commission, 282 1. S. 1 (1930).
"Provident Savings Ass'n v. Kentucky, 234 U. S. 103 (1915).
' See Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U. S. 282, 299 (1921).
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
turns," is a delicate process." It consists of the weighing of manifestations of
intent in actions' and recitals" and, frequently left to the jury, is peculiarly subject
to contradictory inferences from identical facts. To a review of this evidential
matter, the overburdened Supreme Court might well prefer a federal district court
injunction at an earlier stage' as a remedy against double taxation. Review, in
any event, apparently awaits a proper raising of due process in the state court."
In the instant case, constitutional discussion included only full faith and credit.
Where the evidence furnishes some support for the finding, the Supreme Court
will not review the facts to determine justification for a court's disregard of
a sister state's judgment because of lack of jurisdiction.Y But the state court is
not the final arbiter of the principles to be applied in determining whether the as-
sumption of jurisdiction was* erroneous' This rule minimizes the danger in-
herent in control of the question of domicile by the lex fore' and the possibility of
a statutory declaration that partial residence is conclusive proof of domicile."
TAXATION-TRuST SETTLED IN CONTEMPLATION OF DEATH-INCREASE IN VALUE
BEFORE DEATH OF SETTLOR AS INCOME OF GRANTEE.-Upon the decedent's death, a
trust settled by him a year previously, was declared -to be a gift in contemplation of
death and its value was included in computing the estate tax. In 1928 the trustee
sold the corpses and, as a transferee in trust taking otherwise than "by bequest or
devise"' paid under protest an income tax measured by the difference between the
cost to the settlor and the selling price. The trustee, insisting that the value at the
grantor's death was the proper lower basis, sued to recover the excess paid. On
motion to dismiss the complaint, held, granted. The imposition of the estate tax did
not convert the conveyance inter vivos into a testamentary transfer so as to preclude
the increase in value before the settlor's death from being "income" of the grantee
within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment. Nor does the use of that increase
in measuring taxes both on the estate of the grantor and on the grantee constitute a
denial of due process. Speer v. Duggan, 5 F. Supp. 722 (S. D. N.Y. 1933).
Any doubt that a transfer of property by way of trust may come within the
provision of an estate tax on gifts in contemplation of death seems now fully re-
moved? But what is income within the Sixteenth Amendment presents a trouble-
'RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1930) § 20; GOODRICH, CONFLICT Or
LAWS (1927) § 24.
"See Grim v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co., 171 App. Div. 493, 496, 157 N.Y.
Supp. 585, 587 (2d Dept. 1916).
"Dickinson v. Brookline, 181 Mass. 195, 63 N. E. 331 (1902).
In re Lyon's Estate, 116 Misc. 540, 191 N.Y. Supp. 260 (Surr. Ct. 1921).
"Cf. City Bank Farmers' Trust Co. v. Schnader, 291 U. S. 24 (1934).
"Cf. Dorrance v. Pennsylvania, 287 U. S. 660 (1932).
"Thomson v. Whitman, 85 U.S. 457 (1873); Burbank v. Ernst, 232 U.S.
162 (1914).
'Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U. S. 155 (1901); E. M. Dodd, Jr., The Power
of the Supreme Court to Review State Decisions it Conflict of Laws (1926). 39
HAv. L. Rxv. 533.
'RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1930) § 11.
"E.g. COLO. ANN. STAT. (Mills, 1930) § 6205.
' Revenue Act of 1928, 45 STAT. 819(3), 26 U. S. C. A. § 2113 (a)(3) (1928);
U. S. Treas. Reg. 74, art. 594 (1929).
'Helvering v. New York Trust Co., 54 Sup. Ct. 806 (1934).
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